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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Brian Keith Calderwood appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Officer Morlock received a tip of a suspicious person near Gary’s Automotive.  
(State’s Ex. 1; 05/25/16 Tr. p. 5, Ls. 5-8.)  The tipster’s name was not disclosed; 
however, law enforcement knew his or her address and phone number.  (See State’s Ex. 
1.) 
 Officer Morlock responded to the scene “two to four minutes” after the call, 
arriving around 3:15 a.m.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 9-24.)  The officer discovered closed 
businesses, no other traffic, and only one person on the scene.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – 
p. 6, L. 4.)  The person—later identified to be Calderwood—was near an intersection on 
the north side of the street.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-12; p. 11, Ls. 9-14.)  Calderwood 
was walking south, towards the direction of Gary’s Automotive on the southeast corner, 
and a church on the southwest.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 9-24; p. 6, Ls. 2-6.) 
 Officer Morlock was in his vehicle and also traveling southbound.  (05/25/16 Tr., 
p. 6, Ls. 15-16.)  When the officer made eye contact with Calderwood, Calderwood 
“look[ed] away rather sharply, as if he just doesn’t want to be seen.”  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 6, 
Ls. 15-18.)  The officer turned around and started to get out of his vehicle, but “before [he 
could] get out of [his] vehicle completely” Calderwood began to run.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 7, 
Ls. 10-16.) 
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 Calderwood ran “south onto the church,” near the bushes against the building, 
running its perimeter until he did a “complete rotation.”  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 3-15.)  
Officer Morlock was following in his vehicle, driving up on the property and onto the 
grass, and noting that Calderwood was “digging really hard into his pockets.”  (05/25/16 
Tr., p. 8, L. 18 – p. 9, L. 11.)  The officer, “focusing on driving,” did not actually see 
Calderwood take anything out of his pockets.  (05/25/16 Tr. p. 9, Ls. 9-11.)  During 
Calderwood’s flight, Officer Morlock did not have his patrol car’s overhead lights or 
spotlight on.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-22; p. 29, L. 25 – p. 30, L. 8.) 
 After Calderwood ran around the church he stopped in the middle of the road.  
(05/25/16 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 12-14.)  At this point Officer Morlock had not issued any 
commands to Calderwood, because the officer had “not even exited [his] vehicle yet.”  
(05/25/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 1-6.)  Unprompted by Officer Morlock, Calderwood “[threw] his 
hands up,” turned and faced the officer, and walked towards him with his hands on top of 
his head.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 1-14.)  Once Calderwood was 15 to 20 feet away 
Officer Morlock asked Calderwood “to go to his knees” and handcuffed him, which the 
officer later conceded was a detention.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 10, L. 16 – p. 11, L. 7; p. 21, 
Ls. 8-18.) 
 When asked why he ran, Calderwood told the officer “something to the effect of, I 
was getting rid of my paraphernalia or I was ditching my paraphernalia.”  (05/25/16 Tr., 
p. 12, Ls. 12-19.)  Another officer confirmed this by searching the “exact route” 
Calderwood ran, where she found a vial with brownish liquid and a “clear plastic baggy 
with a very small amount of crystal-like substance.”  (Tr., p. 13, L. 21 – p. 14, L. 8; p. 22, 
Ls. 15-25.)  Officer Morlock also searched Calderwood’s person and found two syringes, 
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one of which had a “small vial” attached.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 1-13.)  Officer 
Morlock determined within 5 to 10 minutes that Calderwood had active warrants for his 
arrest.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-11; p. 23, Ls. 2-7; p. 33, Ls. 20-23.) 
 The state charged Calderwood with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 22-23.) 
 Calderwood moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was the product of an 
illegal detention.  (R., pp. 39-47.)  The state responded that Calderwood had abandoned 
the items he tossed out (R., p. 62), that the syringes on his person would have been 
inevitably discovered due to his arrest warrants (05/25/16 Tr., p. 45, L. 22 – p. 46, L. 4), 
and that, in any event, reasonable suspicion justified the detention  (R., p. 62; 05/25/16 
Tr., p. 45, Ls. 7-14). 
 The district court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning: 
The officer did place Calderwood in handcuffs, but based on the fact that 
Calderwood had previously tried to flee from the officer, the time of night 
and the fact Officer Morlock was alone, handcuffing Calderwood was 
reasonable and, in the Court’s view, handcuffing Calderwood did not rise 
to the level of “custody,” nor “exceed the permissible bounds of an 




The encounter occurred well after midnight, prompted by a call from a 
concerned citizen.  Calderwood was located at the place where the 
suspicious activity was reported, and then the individual ran from the 
officer.  There was reasonable suspicion for Officer Morlock to detain 
Calderwood in order to investigate criminal conduct.  Calderwood 
admitted to ditching drug paraphernalia.  When Officer Morlock ran 
Calderwood’s information for wants and warrants, he learned that there 
were active warrants. 
 
Officer Morlock retrieved a syringe from Calderwood’s hoody and a 
syringe from his pocket.  Because Calderwood had active warrants, these 
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items would inevitably been discovered as part of the arrest and/or 
booking process. 
 
(R., pp. 78-79.) 
 Following the court’s denial of his motion, Calderwood pleaded guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine pursuant to a plea agreement with the state.  (R., pp. 98-
99; 07/20/16 Tr., p. 12, L. 24 – p. 13, L. 19.)  Calderwood reserved his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress, and timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp. 93-96, 98-99, 103-05, 108-12.) 
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ISSUES 
 
Calderwood states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Calderwood’s motion to suppress 
because Officer Morlock lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
I. Has Calderwood failed to show that the syringes and paraphernalia on his person 
should be suppressed because he has failed to challenge the district court’s 
conclusion that they would have been inevitably discovered? 
 
II. Does Calderwood have standing to challenge the recovery of the drugs and 
paraphernalia he abandoned prior to being detained? 
 
III. Has Calderwood failed to show any error on the merits of the district court’s 
decision? 




Calderwood Fails To Show The Syringes Found On His Person Should Be Suppressed, 
Because He Has Failed To Challenge The District Court’s Conclusion That They Would 
Have Been Inevitably Discovered 
 
“Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and only 
one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the 
uncontested basis.”  Rich v. State, 159 Idaho 553, 555, 364 P.3d 254, 256 (2015) (quoting 
State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517–18, 164 P.3d 790, 797–98 (2007)).  To preserve 
arguments on appeal parties must raise issues in their opening briefs.  Patterson v. State, 
Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (2011) (“In order to 
be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to identify legal issues and provide 
authorities supporting the arguments in the opening brief.”).     
Law enforcement found two syringes on Calderwood’s person.  (05/25/16 Tr., 
p. 22, Ls. 1-13.)1  Below the state argued that due to Calderwood’s active warrants those 
syringes on his person would have been inevitably discovered.  (Tr., p. 45, L. 22 – p. 46, 
L. 4.)  The district court likewise found that following the initial detention “Officer 
Morlock learned of Calderwood’s active warrants,” and “[b]ecause Morlock [sic] had 
active warrants” the syringes on his person would have “inevitably been discovered as 
part of the arrest and/or booking process.”  (R., p. 79 (citing State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 
784, 787, 352 P.3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2015)).) 
                                            
1 The syringe found in Calderwood’s pocket was loaded with a liquid, the nature of which 
was not a fact in evidence at the suppression hearing.  However, the PSI indicates that the 
liquid tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  (See PSI, pp. 3, 46-47.) 
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 Calderwood has only challenged the reasonable suspicion underlying the 
detention on appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.)  He does not mention, much less 
challenge, the district court’s conclusion that the syringes would have been inevitably 
discovered as a result of his active warrants, and concomitant arrest and booking search.  
(See generally, Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.)  Accordingly, the district court’s decision must 
be affirmed on the unchallenged basis. 
II. 
Because Calderwood Abandoned Paraphernalia And The Plastic Baggy Prior To The 
Detention He Has No Standing To Challenge Their Seizure 
 
A. Introduction 
 Prior to ever approaching the officer, and prior to the alleged illegal detention at 
issue, Calderwood threw away paraphernalia and a plastic baggy containing a white 
crystal substance.  Because Calderwood voluntarily abandoned these items he has no 
privacy interest in them and no standing to challenge their seizure. 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the 
trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial 
court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of 
the facts.  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State 
v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004).  If findings are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, those “[f]indings will not be deemed clearly 
erroneous.”  State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
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C. Calderwood Abandoned Paraphernalia And The Plastic Baggy Containing White 
Crystal Substance Prior To His Detention And Accordingly Has No Standing To 
Challenge The Officer’s Recovery Of Them 
 
 The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  Thus, as a threshold matter, 
“one who challenges the legality of a search must establish that he or she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the thing searched.”  State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 
981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 
(1980)). 
An individual who “voluntarily abandons property prior to the search cannot be 
said to possess the requisite privacy interest” in the property.  Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52, 
981 P.2d at 1162 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)).  Abandonment 
in this context “occurs through words, act, and other objective facts indicating that the 
defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in his 
property.”  Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52, 981 P.2d at 1162 (citing United States v. Ramos, 
12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1994); Bond v. United States, 77 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 
1996); United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996)).  The Harwood Court 
cautioned that “[i]f the abandonment is caused by illegal police conduct, however, the 
abandonment is not voluntary.”  133 Idaho at 52, 981 P.2d at 1162; see also United States 
v. Roman, 849 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 
1045 (6th Cir. 1982). 
Here, Calderwood abandoned paraphernalia and a plastic baggy containing a 
white crystal substance prior to being detained.  Officer Morlock testified that as 
-- --- ---------
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Calderwood ran around the building he was “digging really hard into his pockets.”  
(05/25/16 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 8-11.)  Calderwood admitted to the officer “something to the 
effect of, I was getting rid of my paraphernalia or I was ditching my paraphernalia.”  
(05/25/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 16-19.)  Later, another officer retrieved “a clear plastic baggy” 
along the “exact route” Calderwood was pursued.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 3-8; p. 22, 
Ls. 22-25.)2   Law enforcement also recovered a “small key chain with a wire scraper in a 
small vial” from the church property and another syringe in the road where Calderwood 
was contacted.  (05/25/16 Tr., p., 13, Ls. 19-24; p. 22, Ls. 15-20.) 
 Critically, Calderwood not only abandoned the paraphernalia and plastic baggy 
prior to voluntarily approaching Officer Morlock, but prior to the allegedly illegal 
detention or any other allegedly illegal police action.  Because Calderwood has not 
argued, much less established, that any illegal police conduct caused him to jettison the 
items, they were abandoned voluntarily.  Calderwood therefore relinquished any privacy 
interest in the abandoned paraphernalia and the plastic baggy.  Cf. Padilla v. State, 
161 Idaho 624, 628, 389 P.3d 169, 173 (2016) (where the Supreme Court denied 
suppression of items on the ground near the defendant because “his seizure was not 
unconstitutional, and the items were just lying on the ground where they could be found 
without seizing him”). 
                                            
2 While the nature of the white crystal substance was not a fact in evidence at the 
suppression hearing, the PSI indicates that the substance later tested positive for 
methamphetamine.  (See PSI, p. 51.) 
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Calderwood briefly addressed the state’s abandonment argument below but he 
does not renew that challenge or otherwise address abandonment on appeal.3  (See 
generally Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.)  Because Calderwood threw away the paraphernalia 
and clear plastic baggy prior to the detention, he voluntarily abandoned them, and has no 
privacy interest in them.  He correspondingly has no standing to challenge their seizure. 
III. 




 Calderwood argues on appeal that the detention was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.)  This argument fails because the district court 
correctly determined reasonable suspicion justified the detention and the ensuing recovery 
of drugs and paraphernalia.  Alternatively, the items on Calderwood’s person were 
properly seized due to Calderwood’s arrest warrant, either due to their inevitable 
discovery, or due to the attenuation doctrine.  In any event, the district court properly 
denied Calderwood’s motion on the merits. 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers to the 
trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial 
court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of 
                                            
3 Below, Calderwood appeared to allude that because the officer did not see Calderwood 
abandon the drugs, but only heard about it in allegedly-suppressible statements, 
abandonment was a non-issue.  (See 05/25/16 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 9-13.)  However, 
Calderwood has not renewed this challenge on appeal.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  
Neither has Calderwood specifically contested the district court’s conclusion that the 
statements were legally obtained.  (Compare R. pp. 79-80 with Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.) 
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the facts.  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State 
v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004).  If findings are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, those “[f]indings will not be deemed clearly 
erroneous.”  State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
C. The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Calderwood 
 
 Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Such 
a detention “is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify 
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity.”  State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 
(1981)).  Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory seizure 
is determined by the totality of the circumstances.  State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 
829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992). 
 Reasonable suspicion may be provided “by an informant’s tip or a citizen’s report 
of suspicious activity.”  State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 
2000).  While an anonymous tip is “generally not enough” to provide the requisite 
reasonable suspicion, the Idaho Court of Appeals has clarified that even where the record 
does not show a caller’s name was given to police, where a caller “gave her address and 
thereby made her identity readily ascertainable,” and her report was “subject to immediate 
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confirmation by responding police,” such a caller was “not an anonymous caller.”  See id. 
at 102, 15 P.3d at 337. 
 Fleeing from the police can also create reasonable suspicion: “Headlong flight—
wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of 
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
124 (2000).  The Idaho Supreme Court has accordingly found reasonable suspicion and a 
justified detention in a case strikingly similar to this one: 
In this case, the facts available to the officer were that he saw Mr. Padilla 
walking down an alley at about 2:00 a.m.; that he turned on his car’s 
headlights and drove to a place near Mr. Padilla, positioned the car so that 
Mr. Padilla could clearly see that it was a marked police car, and stopped; 
and that, as he began getting out of the car, Mr. Padilla fled. Mr. Padilla 
did not merely run away down the sidewalk, alley, or street when the 
officer began getting out of the police car. He ran between two houses and 
jumped over a fence. Considering the totality of the facts available to the 
officers, they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe criminal 
activity may be afoot and could seize Mr. Padilla in order to investigate 
their suspicion. 
 
Padilla v. State, 161 Idaho 624, 627, 389 P.3d 169, 172 (2016).  The Padilla Court 
therefore concluded that “the seizure of Mr. Padilla did not violate his rights under the 
Constitution of the United States.”  Id. 
 Applying those standards here, the district court correctly concluded that there 
was reasonable suspicion to detain Calderwood.  The officer received a tip from a 
concerned caller, whose address and phone number were known, regarding a suspicious 
person in the area around 3:00 a.m.  (State’s Ex. 1; 05/25/16 Tr. p. 5, Ls. 5-8.)  The 
officer responded to the area and discovered Calderwood, clad in dark clothing, who 
looked “away rather sharply” when the officer made eye contact with him.  (05/25/16 Tr., 
p. 5, Ls. 5-15; p. 6, Ls. 13-18; p. 27, L. 25 – p. 28, L. 1.)  When the officer exited his 
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vehicle Calderwood suddenly ran—and like Padilla, did not “merely run away down the 
sidewalk, alley, or street”—Calderwood fully circumnavigated a building, while digging 
through his pockets, before stopping and walking to the officer with his hands raised 
behind his head.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 – p. 10, L. 14); see Padilla, 161 Idaho at 627, 
389 P.3d at 172.  These factors, taken together, provided more than enough reasonable 
suspicion to detain Calderwood.  
 On appeal, Calderwood argues that the “tip was anonymous” and therefore lacked 
veracity.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  However, the Larson Court found that where, among 
other things, a caller gave her address and phone number, and the report was subject to 
immediate confirmation, the tip was not “anonymous” despite the lack of a name. 
135 Idaho at 102, 15 P.3d at 337.  Here, because law enforcement knew the caller’s 
address and phone number, and Officer Morlock confirmed within minutes that the report 
was accurate, the tip was likewise not anonymous or lacking veracity.  (State’s Ex., 1; 
05/25/16 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 9-24.) 
Calderwood challenges the district court’s finding that he was “‘at the place where 
the suspicious activity occurred,’” arguing that “he was not walking or running away from 
the shop, and there was no indication he had been at the shop,” but instead he was simply 
“on the other side of the street from the auto repair shop, walking towards” the southern 
intersection.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (quoting R., p. 79).)  Calderwood also claims the 
court erred by finding Calderwood was “at the place where suspicious activity occurred,” 
given its other finding that “Mr. Calderwood was only ‘in the vicinity’ of the auto repair 
shop.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (emphasis added).) 
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But this argument fails, for the simple reason that the place of the suspicious 
activity was the vicinity of Gary’s Automotive: the officer was dispatched to “respond to 
an area near Albion, Orchard and Cassia,” because it was “the area of Gary’s 
Automotive where a call came out for a suspicious individual or vehicle.”  (05/25/16 Tr., 
p. 3, Ls. 9-12; p. 5, Ls. 5-8 (emphasis added).)  Moreover, the tip did not precisely state 
the person was inside Gary’s Automotive or walking away from it.  (See State’s Ex. 1.)  
Instead, the tip nebulously placed the suspect at Gary’s, or perhaps in the parking lot, or 
maybe across the street—in other words, in the vicinity of the shop:  “ACROSS AT THE 
STREET AT GARYS AUTO THERE IS A CAR IN THE PKLOT WITH PARKING 
LIGHTS ON AND A MALE IS WALKING AROUND. UNK DESCRIPTION.”  (State’s 
Ex. 1.)   Simply put, the place of suspected activity was by definition a vicinity: the 
vicinity of Gary’s Automotive, where Calderwood was found walking around, just as the 
tip said someone would be.  The district court therefore correctly found that Calderwood 
was at the place where the suspicious activity occurred, and given that Calderwood was 
the only person found at this place, his presence there was self-evidently suspicious.4 
 Lastly, Calderwood claims many of the factors considered by the court were not 
reasonably suspicious.  In particular, he argues that “flight from law enforcement does not 
necessarily establish reasonable suspicion,” that “[h]e did look away when Officer 
Morlock made eye contact with him, but this was not inherently suspicious,” and that in 
                                            
4 And the officer explained why it was equally suspicious for Calderwood to be headed 
toward Gary’s Automotive: “it was very common for individuals to go to an area that they 
are maybe prowling around and then leave and then come back or go from that area and 
then drop off items that have been taken and then go back for more items.”  (05/25/16 Tr., 
p. 14, L. 23 – p. 15, L. 2.) 
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light of this “the only suspicious thing Officer Morlock saw Mr. Calderwood do was run 
away while sticking his hands in his pockets.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) 
 This line of argument fails insofar as it tries to isolate and dispatch the suspicious 
factors one by one, instead of weighing them in aggregate.  Piecemeal inquiries into 
whether one factor “necessarily establish[es] reasonable suspicion,” or whether another 
factor is “inherently suspicious” are beside the point; the question is whether Officer 
Morlock was reasonably suspicious given all of the factors taken together.  See Rawlings, 
121 Idaho at 932, 829 P.2d at 522. 
 And here the totality of the circumstances did establish reasonable suspicion: 
Officer Morlock responded to a suspicious-person tip and found Calderwood alone, late 
at night, in a place with no open businesses.  (05/25/16 Tr. p. 5, L. 5 – p. 6, L. 12.)  
Calderwood was furtively avoiding eye contact with the police officer (05/25/16 Tr., p. 6, 
Ls. 13-18), and once the officer exited his vehicle Calderwood took off, running around a 
building while rummaging through his pockets, before walking back to the officer in a 
hands-up pose (05/25/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 – p. 10, L. 14).  All of these factors, taken 
together, gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain Calderwood.  See Padilla, 
161 Idaho at 627, 389 P.3d at 172 (finding reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant 
based on far fewer factors, and based on a factually similar flight).  And because the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Calderwood, the district court correctly denied 
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D. Alternatively, Because Calderwood Had Active Warrants, The Drugs And 
Paraphernalia On His Person Would Have Been Inevitably Discovered, Or 
Properly Seized Pursuant To The Attenuation Doctrine 
 
Alternatively, even if this Court concludes Calderwood was illegally detained, 
excluding the evidence of the drugs and paraphernalia found on his person would be 
improper under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 
101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 (Ct. App. 2002) (inevitable discovery doctrine is an 
exception to the exclusionary rule).  Where the prosecution establishes by a 
preponderance of proof that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by 
lawful means, then exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained 
by constitutionally improper means.  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart v. 
State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001).  The underlying rationale of 
this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position it would 
have been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; 
Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813. 
Here, the drugs and paraphernalia found on Calderwood’s person would have 
been inevitably discovered.  Regardless of the propriety of the officer’s instruction for 
Calderwood to get down, by that time Calderwood had already voluntarily approached the 
officer with his hands over his head.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 10, L. 3 – p. 11, L. 7.)  “At that 
point” Officer Morlock made the decision that he “was going to speak to him as to his 
behavior,” and the officer further stated that “when we ask people for their names, we try 
to reverify [sic] that that’s the actual name he gave.”  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 11-22; 
p. 33, Ls. 20-23.)  On these facts the officer would have inevitably discovered 
Calderwood’s name and the existence of the warrants, and the officer specifically testified 
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the warrants were a reason for the arrest.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 34, L. 22 – p. 35, L. 4.)   The 
district court therefore correctly concluded, “[b]ecause Morlock [sic] had active 
warrants,” the drugs and paraphernalia “would inevitably been discovered as part of the 
arrest and/or booking process.”5  (R., p. 79.) 
 Finally, Calderwood’s active warrant and the other circumstances of the search 
make the attenuation doctrine applicable here.  Under the attenuation doctrine evidence 
may be admitted “when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the 
evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the 
interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be 
served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’”  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 
(2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).  To determine whether 
the attenuation doctrine applies, courts look to three factors: “the elapsed time between 
the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence”; whether there were any intervening 
circumstances, such as an arrest warrant; and whether the police misconduct “is 
purposeful or flagrant.”  State v. Cohagan, No. 44800, 2017 WL 3623658, at *3 (Idaho 
Aug. 24, 2017) (emphasis in original, citing Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056).   
In Cohagan, while the existence of an arrest warrant weighed “strongly in favor of 
attenuation,” the court found there was no attenuation due to purposeful or flagrant police 
misconduct.  No. 44800, 2017 WL 3623658, at *4–8.  In that case there was “no ‘bona 
fide investigation’”—the officers had “no cause” to stop the defendant, not only because 
they had already identified him, but “because both Officer Otto and Officer Curtis himself 
had already confirmed that Cohagan was not the suspected individual.”  Id. at *6.  In 
                                            
5 As noted supra, Calderwood has not challenged this finding on appeal. 
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other words, “there was simply no reason for Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan and run a 
warrant check.”  Id.  Because the attenuation doctrine does not allow “unjustified, 
suspicionless seizure of citizens,” the attenuation doctrine was inapplicable in that case.  
Id. at *8. 
 But here, there was abundant suspicion and justification for Officer Morlock to 
stop Calderwood: Calderwood was an unidentified individual and the prime suspect in an 
ongoing investigation of a suspicious-person tip.  He was the only person found at the 
reported area.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 6, L. 4.)  It was late at night, Calderwood 
was acting suspiciously, and he ran headlong from the officer while digging through his 
pockets, ultimately concluding his circuitous flight with a hands-up walk back to the 
patrol car.  (05/25/16 Tr., p. 6, L. 13 – p. 10, L. 14.)  Not only was there an ongoing bona 
fide investigation, but the officer had ample justification to detain Calderwood, identify 
him, and investigate “his behavior in the area.”  (See 05/25/16 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 11-12.)  
Because this was nothing like an unjustified, suspicionless search, and because the active 
warrants were an intervening circumstance strongly favoring the state, the attenuation 
doctrine would apply here, and exclusion would be improper regardless of the propriety 
of the detention. 
 For all the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly denied Calderwood’s 
suppression motion on the merits. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order denying 
Calderwood’s motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 7th day of September, 2017. 
 
       
 __/s/ Kale D. Gans_________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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